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Abstract
The xed e¤ects (FE) estimator of "conditional convergence" in income based dynamic
panel models could be biased downward when capital adjustment cost is present. Such a
capital adjustment cost means a rising marginal cost of investment which could slow down
the convergence. The standard FE regression fails to take into account of this capital
adjustment cost and thus it could overestimate the rate of convergence. Using a Ramsey
model with long-run adjustment cost of capital, we characterize this bias that does not go
away even for a longer time dimension. The size of the bias is greater in economies with
a higher adjustment cost. The cross-country regression suggests that the size of this bias
could be substantial.
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1. Introduction
In the empirical economic growth literature, a typical specication of an income
based dynamic panel econometric model has the following form,
ln yit =  ln yit 1 + xit+ i + uit (1)
where yit is the income of the ith cross section unit at date t (= 1; 2; 3; :::; T ), xit
denotes a 1J vector of control and interest variables;  is a J1 parameter vector,
i is the xed e¤ects and uit is the random disturbance term. The parameters  and
 summarize the list of parameters to be estimated. In the convergence literature,
 2 (0; 1) is the crucial parameter of interest because  1, (after subtracting ln yit 1
from both of sides of (1)), measures the coe¢ cient of conditional convergence known
as -convergence.1 Such a concept is used to understand the convergence of countries
or regions to their own steady-state (see, for instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004,
Ch. 11).
The xed e¤ects (FE) estimator is among the main candidates for estimating
eq. (1) when the time horizon T of the panel is su¢ ciently large. In particular,
dynamic panel models with xed e¤ects have been widely employed in the literature
for studying convergence among group of countries (e.g., Islam, 1995, Caselli et al.,
1996 and Ho, 2006). Since the seminal work of Nickell (1981), it is well known that
the xed e¤ects estimator of dynamic panel models is biased when T is short but
1Note that (1 ) can be rewritten as: 4 ln yit =  (1  ) ln yit 1 + xit+ i + uit
=  (1   e ) ln yit 1 + xit + i + uit. This means that  =   ln  ' 1    is a measure of
 convergence: See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 462).
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unbiased and consistent when T !1.
A sizable econometric literature investigates the nature of this FE bias and pos-
sible remedies in dynamic panel data models. For instance, following the work of
Nickell (1981), Kiviet (1995), Judson and Owen (1999) and Hahn and Kuersteiner
(2002) examine this bias in short and long dynamic panel FE models. Arellano
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) provide
a handy way to correct the FE bias in short-time dynamic panel models applying
internal instruments.2
However, the literature has hardly directed any e¤ort to understand the economic
root of such a bias. In this paper, we examine the macroeconomic fundamental
behind a FE bias of an income based dynamic panel model similar to (1). We
identify a convex capital adjustment cost technology as one such fundamental which
means a rising marginal cost of investment. The empirical evidence are abound that
the adjustment cost of capital is present (Chirinko, 1993 and Hamermesh and Pfann,
1996). While diminishing returns to capital facilitate the process of convergence, a
rising marginal cost of investment schedule slows it down. An FE regression fails to
take into account of this capital adjustment cost and thus it overestimates the rate of
convergence. We show this formally by establishing that the income based dynamic
models has a negative rst order moving average error when capital adjustment cost
is present. A negative correlation between the lagged dependent variable ln yit 1 and
the disturbance terms uit in (1) thus arises. An FE estimator does not take into
account of this negative correlation and consequently becomes downward biased.
2However, these are also criticized as sensitive to "instrumental proliferation" (Roodman, 2009).
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To demonstrate this point, we derive a closed form expression for the FE bias
employing a standard Ramsey growth model with a capital adjustment cost tech-
nology. A well known parametric form for the adjustment cost is borrowed from
Lucas and Prescott (1971) that was subsequently used by Basu (1987), Hercowitz
and Sampson (1991) and Basu et al. (2012). Such a capital adjustment cost di¤ers
from the investment adjustment cost (e.g. Christiano et al., 2005) in the sense that
the adjustment cost persists even in the long-run. This explains why the bias stays
even for innite time horizon (T ! 1). The size of this bias increases with the
degree of the adjustment cost of capital.
Using the panel data for 18 OECD countries for the period 1970 to 2010 we com-
pare the performances of the FE regression (1) with GMM estimation that corrects
the bias. The size of the downward bias is estimated to range from 0.75 to 0.84. The
implied Tobinq (a measure of adjustment cost) ranges from 4.35 to 6.66 which is
quite substantial.
The bias resulting from capital adjustment cost is not uncommon in the lit-
erature. Caballero (1994) establishes that the wealth elasticity estimate generally
tends to be downward biased in a small sample when capital adjustment cost is
present. However, there is hardly any attempt in the literature to explore the fact
that country convergence could be seriously overestimated due to the presence of
capital adjustment cost. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst attempt
in the literature to understand the economic fundamentals behind the bias in the
convergence regression in terms of a capital adjustment cost.
In the next section, we develop a Ramsey-type growth model with heterogeneous
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countries in terms of initial wealth, tastes and productivity to characterize the ad-
justment cost bias. Section 3 reports cross country panel estimation. Section 4
concludes.
2. The model
2.1. Preference and technology
Consider a sequence of innitely-lived heterogenous citizens, i = 1, 2, :::, N
and t = 1; 2, :::, 1 where i stands for the country representative3 and t stands for
time. Countries are heterogenous in terms of (i) initial capital stock (ki0), (ii) pref-
erence (discount factor, i) and (iii) productivity shock (it).
4 We let the preference
parameter i vary across countries which could give rise to country specic xed
e¤ects. Also, assume that cross country productivity shocks are i.i.d. Households
are further assumed to be both consumers and entrepreneurs.5
The production function facing the ith country resident is Cobb-Douglas with
constant returns to scale as follows,
qit = it
QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(kit)
! (mit)
' (2)
'+ ! +
Pk
j=1 j = 1 (3)
In (2), kit is the country specic capital stock at period t and ki0 is given. gijt
3Alternatively, i could represent a country in the world economy whereas each country is repre-
sented with a single representative consumer, as in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
4Variables without subscript(s) t but (and) i represent individual (economy-wide) steady state
values.
5See Angeletos and Calvet (2006) for a similar type of entrepreneurship.
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represents the jth input in the production function (e.g., infrastructure or a learning-
by-doing knowledge spillover that is specic to the ith country condition, in the
spirit of Arrow, 1962), which could potentially give rise to technological externality.
In addition, mit is a ow imported intermediate input that the country nances by
borrowing from the international credit market at a xed interest rate, r. The ith
country agent treats gijt as given while choosing consumption and investment. The
production technology thus exhibits private diminishing returns to reproducible input
kit, imported intermediate input mit and the exogenous inputs gijt but aggregate
constant returns to scale similar to Romer (1986) and Barro (1990).6
The ith country borrowsmit at the start of each period and fully pays o¤ the loan
with interest rate at the end of each period. The optimal purchase of intermediate
input thus satises the condition:
@qit=@mit = 1 + r
 (4)
This means that
mit = ['=1 + r
]1=(1 ')
QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j=(1 ')

(kit)
!=(1 ') (it)
1=(1 ') (5)
which upon plugging into (2) and after netting out the loan retirement cost (1+r)mit
gives the net value added (yit),
6Barro (1990) models the production function at the individual rm level as a function of private
and public capital.
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yit = it
QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(kit)
 (6)
where it  (1  ') ('= (1 + r))'=(1 ') (it)1=(1 '), j  j=1 ' and   != (1  ').
The ith country agent maximizes her utility in accordance to the utility function,
E0
P1
t=0 (i)
t ln cit

(7)
subject to the budget constraint,
cit + sit = yit (8)
where cit and sit represent consumption and saving, respectively.
Following Lucas and Prescott (1971), Basu (1987) and Basu et al. (2012), the
investment technology is given by the following specication:
kit+1 = kit (1   + sit=kit) (9)
where  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) are rate of depreciation and degree of adjustment cost
of capital (kit), respectively. If  = 0, adjustment cost of capital is prohibitively high
to change the capital stock. However, if  = 1, adjustment cost of capital is zero and
we obtain a standard linear depreciation rule.
Supposing capital depreciates fully each period, we may then rewrite (9) as:
kit+1 = kit (sit=kit)
 (10)
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Applying standard methods of undetermined coe¢ cient, the optimal policy func-
tions for the ith agent are as follows, (see Appendix A for details in the derivation),7
cit = (1   i) yit (11a)
sit =  iyit (11b)
where
 i  i= (1  i (1  )) (12)
After substituting (6) and (11b) into (10), the optimal dynamic equation of capital
stock of the ith country resident is given by,
kit+1 = ( i)
 (kit)

QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(it)
 (13)
where   1   (1  ) . Therefore, the optimal capital dynamics at the individual
country level is a function of the countrys initial capital (kit), the idiosyncratic shock
(it), time-dependent country specic exogenous factors (gijt) and a time-independent
country specic factor ( i).
7See also, Basu (1987) and Hercowitz and Sampson (1991) for a similar closed form solution.
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2.2. Role of long-run adjustment cost in determining the bias
According to (13), the adjustment cost of capital ( 6= 1) impacts not only the
dynamics of capital at the individual country level but also the steady-state capital.8
To see this, set j = 0 for all j (for simplicity) and verify that the long-run mean
and variance of the log of capital stock with respect to the ith country are given by
( ln i)=(1   ) and 22= (1  %2) respectively,9 which depend on the adjustment
cost parameter . Thus the adjustment cost does not disappear in the long-run.10
In the present context, this long-lasting nature of the adjustment cost is particu-
larly reected on its e¤ect on the idiosyncratic shock. First, this idiosyncratic shock
forms the disturbance term in an estimation equation (1). Second, the shock relates
to countrys contemporaneous income (6), which appears as a lagged variable in dy-
namic panel regression models. Therefore, such e¤ects of the idiosyncratic shock will
manifest as a bias in the estimate of the lagged income in (1).
Based on the production function (6), the log of income of the ith country at
date t is given by,
ln yit =  ln kit +
PJ
j=1 (j ln gijt) + ln it
=  ln kit + git+ lnAit (14)
8Note that in the present model, the country specic xed e¤ect arises solely due to di¤erences
in the taste parameter i. A more general specication can allow for di¤erences in technology which
we do not pursue here.
9Refer to footnote 10 below for details of the derivation of the variance.
10Note that the adjustment cost functions of Christiano et al. (2005) do not have such long run
e¤ects. See Basu et al. (2012) and Groth and Khan (2010) for a discussion.
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where git is 1J vector of (exogenous) regressors, git  (ln gi1t; ln gi2t; :::; ln giJt) and
 (1; 2; :::; J)0 is a J  1.
Finally, applying (6) and (13) to (14), we obtain the following representation for
the dynamic panel model:
ln yit =  ln yit 1 +
PJ
j=1 jxijt + i + uit (15)
where i   ln i and,
xijt  (   1) ln gijt 1 + ln gijt (16a)
uit = ln it   (1  ) ln it 1 (16b)
In vector form,
ln yit =  ln yit 1 + xit+ i + uit (17)
where xit  (xi1t; xi2t; :::; xiJt) is a 1J ,  (1; 2; :::; J)0 as xijt is dened in (16a)
while uit is given by (16b).
Eq. (17) is an ARMA (1,1) evolution of the income of the ith country which
looks observationally equivalent to (1). It represents the true specication for the
estimation model of conditional convergence based on the Ramsey growth model with
a non-zero long-run adjustment cost of capital. Such adjustment cost can be seen as
a permanent tax on capital imposed by mother nature. The long-run impact of such
idiosyncratic shock (13) is responsible for the negative moving average disturbance
10
term (uit) in (17).
The income based dynamic panel regression model thus involves an error term
which is negatively correlated with the lagged dependent variable (ln yit 1). There-
fore, not only the OLS but also the FE estimators of  are biased and inconsistent,
even when T !1.
To see the magnitude of the bias involved in the lagged income term, set j = 0
for all j to simplify exposition. Then, the following Proposition and Corollary can
be stated for the univariate case:
Proposition 1. The bias from the FE estimator (b) of the coe¢ cient  with respect
to (17), when 8j j = 0, is given by:
b =  + (   1) 2=Ei var [ln yit 1] (18)
where 2 = var(it):
Proof. See Appendix B.
Corollary 1. The size of the bias is given by
  (1  
2) (1  )
22 + (1  2) : (19)
Proof. Using (14), when 8j j = 0, we can rewrite the denominator in (18) as,
Ei var [ln yit 1] = Ei var [ ln kit 1 + ln it 1]
= 2 Ei var [ln kit 1] + 2 (20)
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Then, from (13),
Ei var [ln kit 1] = Ei var [ln i +  ln kit 2 +  ln it 2]
= 2 Ei var [ln kit 2] + 
22 (21)
since i is xed over time and cov(ln kit; ln it) = 0. Next note from (13) that for
a generic ith country agent, limt!1 var [ln kit 1] = var [ln kit 2] = 2
2= (1  2)
because 0 <  < 1.11 Since ; 2 and  are the same for all i, all agents converge to
the same variance of the capital stock which implies
Ei var [ln kit 1] = 2
2=
 
1  2 (22)
Substitute (20) into (18) after substituting (22) into the former to derive the closed
form solution for the bias.
Thus in the presence of capital adjustment cost in a growth model, the FE es-
timator of  in (1) is biased regardless of the time dimension of the panel. This
overestimates the conditional convergence. It is straightforward to verify that this
bias is greater in economies with a lower value of  meaning a higher adjustment
cost. The bias is absent if there is no capital adjustment cost ( = 1).
The downward bias in the FE estimator arises due to a negative contemporaneous
11To see this, rewrite (21) as:
Ei var [ln kit] = 
2T
Ei var [ln ki0] + 
22
PT
t=0 
2t
= 2T Ei var [ln ki0] + 
22
 
1  2T+2 =  1  2
As T !1, the terms in the right hand side converge to 22=  1  2.
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correlation between ln yit 1 and ln it 1. The size of this correlation is proportional
to the degree of adjustment cost (1   ). To get the (economic) intuition further
for such a negative correlation, let the ith country experience a positive TFP shock
( ln it 1%) at date t  1. The optimal investment rule (11b) dictates that the ith
country residents contemporaneous investment rises by the same percent because the
elasticity of sit 1 with respect to it 1 is unity. Such a blip in investment ( ln sit 1)
increases the current capital stock (ln kit) by only % (see (10)). The remaining (1 
)% of the investment is lost due to the presence of the long-run capital adjustment
cost. This loss enters the error term in (17) with a negative coe¢ cient ( (1  
) ln it 1). The standard regression equation (1) ignores this negative correlation
between ln yit 1 and ln it 1: As a result, the estimate of  will be downward biased
and, hence, the "conditional convergence" will be upward biased.
In the multivariate case where 9j j 6= 0, the FE bias a¤ect the estimators of
all variables due to a correlation between lagged output and exogenous technological
variables. Proposition 2 below demonstrates this.
Proposition 2. The bias from the FE estimators of b and b of the parameters 
and  with respect to (17) are given by, when 9j j 6= 0:
be = e+ (Ei E [b0itbit]) 1 p(   1)2 (23)
where bit  exit   exi, e  (;0)0, p  (1;0)0 and 0 is 1 J zero vector.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The last term in (23) is di¤erent from zero with a non-zero adjustment cost of
capital ( 6= 1). Therefore, in the multivariate case all the coe¢ cient estimates of
the variables in (17) are a¤ected from the bias when the adjustment cost of capital
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is present.
3. Cross-country dynamic panel estimation
Our model predicts that a FE estimator overestimates the rate of convergence if
in the true model the capital adjustment cost is present while the estimated model
ignores it. Is this predication validated by the data? There are two ways to address
this issue. First is a structural form approach by testing our parametric adjust-
ment cost model directly against the data. Due to the highly stylized nature of the
model and restrictive functional forms for preference and technology, this approach
is unlikely to lead to any conclusive evidence.
The second approach that we actually follow here is a reduced form approach.
We propose to run the FE and GMM regressions based on the specication (1)
and check which estimation methodology yields realistic convergence coe¢ cient. For
a su¢ ciently large time horizon, the bias from FE dynamic panel data model is
supposed to be small (Nickell, 1981) and hence the estimates from the two approaches
should be close. Is it really the case with the data?
We address this question by using the cross country annual real GDP data for
18 OECD countries spanning a sample period of 1970-2010. The details of the data
and list of countries are in the Appendix D. Since our model ARMA is based on a
stationary specication of the real GDP, to make the data consistent with the model
we lter the real GDP series to pick the business cycle component. To this end, we
employ the Christiano-Fitzgerald (2003) lter (CF ltered hereafter) to the log real
GDP of each country to identify the business cycle component (call it ln eyit hereafter)
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of the series. In the next step, we run a dynamic panel regression with an AR(1)
specication for ln eyit which is consistent with our reduced form equation (17) of the
model.
Table 1 reports the results of xed e¤ects regressions for alternative specications.
The rst specication is a simple xed e¤ects AR(1) version of (1) without adding
any control while the remaining three specications add controls such as lagged CF
ltered lagged log of population (ln ePopt 1), lagged CF ltered lagged log of imports
(ln eImpt 1) which may have some bearing on the technology as per our production
function (6).
What is noteworthy is that in all these three specications, the lagged GDP
is robustly 0.14 and statistically signicant even at a 1% level. This suggests a
rate of convergence of about 86% while Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) report that
country -convergence is of the order of 2% for annual real GDP. The FE estimation
thus predicts an implausibly high rate of country convergence even though the time
horizon is su¢ ciently large to o¤set any bias from the xed e¤ects.
The issue arises whether this allegedly fast rate of convergence in FE regression
basically is an artifact of a classic omitted variable bias or it supports our hypothesis
of an adjustment cost bias. Since the convergence coe¢ cient is remarkably insensitive
to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables in the regression, we do not
ascribe this bias to the omitted variable specication.12
Table 2 reports the estimates of convergence for GMM dynamic panel speci-
12We have also added controls such as investment-GDP ratio (not reported here for brevity) and
the convergence coe¢ cient does not change much. Moreover, omitted variables could give rise to
either upward or downward bias while in our case the bias is robustly downward.
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Table 1: Dynamic FE Panel Regression of log real GDP
Dependent Variable: ln eyt (CF Filtered)
Model const ln eyt 1 ln ePopt 1 ln (eImpt 1)
FE (1) 6:88E   05 0:136** - -
FE(2) 7:1E   05 0:136** 0:035 -
FE(3) 6:9E   05 0:145** 0:026  0:003
Note:** means signicant at the 1% level.
cations which adjust for the bias using alternative sets of instruments. The GMM
estimation follows the Arellano-Bover (1995) procedure of running a regression with
orthogonal deviation to adjust for the country xed e¤ects.13 The GMM speci-
cations 1 through 3 report the results for best sets of instruments.14 First two
specications predict that the rate of country convergence is in line with Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004) estimate for -convergence. The third specication which adds
lagged population as a regressor has about a 10% rate of convergence. This conver-
gence is higher than Barro and Sala-i-Martin which could be due to the fact that
they do not run FE regression.
Table 2: Dynamic GMM Panel Regression of log real GDP
Model Instruments used const ln eyit 1 ln ePopt 1 J Statistic
GMM (1) ln eyit 3, Inv_ratio - 0:982** - 1:11(0:29)
GMM (2) ln eyit 3, ln(Imp) - 0:952** - 1:33(0:24)
GMM (3) ln eyit 3, Inv_ratio, ln(Exp) - 0:894**  3:43 1:88(0:17)
Note: Same as Table 1 and numbers in parenthesis in the last column represent prob values.
See also Footnote 14 for details about the instruments.
13A 2SLS weighting matrix is used for covariance calculation. Using alternative weighting matri-
ces do not change the convergence coe¢ cient remarkably.
14The instruments used are the third lagged log CF ltered GDP, investment:GDP ratio
(Inv_ratio), log of import (ln (Imp)) and log of export (ln (Exp)) which produce the best J sta-
tistics. Except GDP, other instruments are not CF ltered.
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3.1. Inferring the adjustment cost from the FE bias
One can infer the extent of capital adjustment cost based on the FE bias. The
actual size of the FE bias can be ascertained by subtracting the FE estimate from
the GMM estimate. Based on alternative specications for GMM the size of the
bias ranges from 0:75 to 0:84: According to corollary 1, the bias is given by . Using
the conventional estimate of 0:36 as the capital share ! and 14% of import share in
GDP (') in the USA based on the OECD facebook, one can compute an estimate
for  (= != (1  ')) equal to 0:42. Given the observed range of bias between 0.75
to 0.84, the value of  based on (19) ranges from 0:23 to 0:15. This suggests that
the steady-state Tobins q (a measure of capital adjustement cost) ranges from 4:35
to 6:66.15 Although this bias and the implied adjustment cost seem quite steep, it
is not necessarily out of line with the reality. Caballero and Engel (2003) point out
that even after aggregating the investment of US manufacturing rms, the speed
of adjustment to macroeconomic shocks could be overestimated by 400% in linear
models.
4. Conclusion
The economic fundamentals that could generate bias in estimation models have
rarely received any attention in macroeconometrics literature. Such a bias could
arise due to several economic fundamentals. We identify one such fundamental in
income based dynamic panel models which is the long-run capital adjustment cost.
15Based on the adjustment cost function (9), the marginal q is given by (1=) (kit+1=kit)
(1 )=.
In a deterministic steady-state, it is 1=. See Basu et al. (2012) for the derivation of q.
17
Using a parametric form for such an adjustment cost technology in a standard Ram-
sey growth model, we have demonstrated that the xed e¤ects estimator of income
based dynamic panel models could be downward biased even for an innite time
horizon when the adjustment cost of capital is present and not properly accounted
for. The size of this bias is larger in economies with a higher adjustment cost of
capital. The implication of this bias is that the xed e¤ects estimate of the "condi-
tional convergence" of countriesnregions could be seriously overestimated unless the
adjustment cost of capital is taken into account. Our cross country dynamic panel
regressions suggest that this bias could be of a serious magnitude which could reect
a very steep adjustment cost.
Although our analysis is based on a specic functional form for the capital ad-
justment cost technology, the key point is that such an adjustment cost has long-run
e¤ects on the economy which translates into an FE bias for a su¢ ciently large time
dimension. This particular conclusion is unlikely to be altered in alternative adjust-
ment cost specications. The future extension of our work would be to take a more
general adjustment cost specication which includes short run investment adjust-
ment cost such as Christiano et al., (2005) and explore the implications for small
and large sample biases in FE regressions.
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Appendix
A. Optimal capital accumulation
The proof mimics Basu (1987). Write the value function for this problem as:
v(kit; it; gi1t; :::; giJt) = max
kit+1
264 ln
n
it
QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(kit)
   (kit+1=kit)1= kit
o
+i Et v(kit+1; it+1; gi1t+1; :::; giJt+1)
375
where Et is the conditional expectation operator.
Conjecture that the value function is loglinear in state variables as follows:
v(kit; it) = 0 + 1 ln kit + 2 ln it + 3
PJ
j=1 j ln gijt
which after plugging into the value function
0 + 1 ln kit + 2 ln it + 3
PJ
j=1 j ln gijt
= max
kit+1
264 ln
n
it
QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(kit)
   (kit+1=kit)1= kit
o
+i Et
n
0 + 1 ln kit+1 + 2 ln it+1 + 3
PJ
j=1 j ln gijt+1
o
375 (A.1)
Di¤erentiating with respect to kit+1 and rearranging terms one gets:
kit+1 = [(1i= (1 + 1i))]
 (it)

QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(kit)
+1  (A.2)
which after plugging into (A.1) and comparing left hand and right side coe¢ cients
of ln kit uniquely solves:
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1 = = (1  i( + 1  ))
which after plugging into (A.2) we get:
kit+1 = fi= (1  i(1  ))g (it)
QJ
j=1 (gijt)
j

(kit)
+1  (A.3)
Note that the decision rule for the capital stock depends only on 1. The re-
maining coe¢ cients, 0, 2 and 3 can also be solved by using the same method of
undetermined coe¢ cients and one can check that they are also uniquely determined
by 1.
B. Proof of proposition 1
First rewrite (17), when 8j j = 0, as:
ln yit =  ln yit 1 + i + uit (B.4)
where uit is given by (16b). Then, rewrite (B.4) in a deviation (from individual
steady-state mean) form as follows to eliminate the unobserved individual hetero-
geneity (i):
ait = ait 1 + vit (B.5)
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where
ait  ln yit   ln yi and ait 1  ln yit 1   ln yi 1 (B.6)
vit  (   1) (ln it 1   ln i 1) + (ln it   ln i) (B.7)
For any z, ln zi  (T   1) 1
PT 1
t=1 ln zit and ln zi 1  T 1
PT
t=1 ln zit 1.
The FE (the within) estimator of  is the pooled OLS estimator of the model
(B.5),
b = PNi=1PTt=1 (aitait 1)PN
i=1
PT
t=1 a
2
it 1
=  +
PN
i=1 T
 1PT
t=1 (vitait 1)PN
i=1 T
 1PT
t=1 a
2
it 1
(B.8)
When T !1, the terms in the right side of (B.8) can be rewritten as,
b =  +PNi=1 E [vitait 1] =PNi=1 E a2it 1 (B.9)
where E(:) stands for the time expectation operator.
Substituting back (B.6) into (B.9), we obtain,
b =  + PNi=1 E [(ln yit 1   E [ln yit 1]) ((   1) ln it 1 + ln it)]PN
i=1 E [(ln yit 1   E [ln yit 1]) (ln yit 1   E [ln yit 1])]
=  +
PN
i=1 cov ((ln yit 1; (   1) ln it 1 + ln it) =
PN
i=1 var [ln yit 1] (B.10)
Note that from (6), cov(ln yit 1; ln it) = 0.16 Thus, (B.10) becomes
16This is also refereed as sequential exogeneity (see Wooldridge, 2010, Ch. 10 & 11).
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b =  + (   1)PNi=1 cov(ln yit 1; ln it 1)=PNi=1 var(ln yit 1) (B.11)
Then, substitute (6) into (B.11) to obtain,
b =  + (   1) cov( ln kit 1 + ln it 1; ln it 1)= var (ln yit 1)
=  + (   1)N 1PNi=1 var(ln it 1)=N 1PNi=1 var (ln yit 1) (B.12)
since kit 1 is predetermined and, hence, uncorrelated with it 1 (see (6)).
Taking N !1, (B.12) can be rewritten as:
b =  + (   1) Ei var(ln it 1)=Ei var (ln yit 1) (B.13)
where Ei(:) represents the cross sectional expectation. Since var(ln it 1) = 2 is the
same for all i, Ei var(ln it 1) = 2.
C. The multivariate case
For the case 9j j 6= 0, rst rewrite (17) as:
ln yit = exite+ i + uit (C.14)
where exit  (ln yit 1;xit) is a 1 (J + 1) and e  (;0)0 is a (J + 1) 1 vector of
parameters.
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Then, transform the equation in (C.14) to eliminate the xed e¤ects (i):
ait = bite+ vit (C.15)
where bit  exit   exi.
Recall that:
ait  ln yit   ln yi (C.16a)
vit  (   1) (ln it 1   ln i 1) + (ln it   ln i) (C.16b)
exit  (ln yit 1;xit) (C.16c)
xit  (xi1t; xi2t; :::; xiJt)
= (   1)git 1 + git (C.16d)
xijt  (   1) ln gijt 1 + ln gijt (C.16e)
git  (ln gi1t; ln gi2t; :::; ln giJt) (C.16f)e  (; 1; 2; :::; J)0 (C.16g)
bit = (ln yit 1   ln yi 1; xi1t   xi1; :::; xiJt   xiJ)
 (bi0t; bi1t; :::; biJt) (C.16h)
The FE estimator of e is the pooled OLS estimator of the model (C.15):
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be = PNi=1PTt=1 (b0itbit) 1PNi=1PTt=1 (b0itait)
= e+ PNi=1 T 1PTt=1 (b0itbit) 1PNi=1 T 1PTt=1 (b0itvit) (C.17)
When T !1, the terms in the right hand side of (C.17) can be rewritten as,
be = e+ PNi=1 E [b0itbit] 1PNi=1 E [b0itvit] (C.18)
Note that, the variance and covariance matrix is given by,
b0itbit =
266666664
b2i0t bi0tbi1t ::: bi0tbiJt
bi1tbi0t b
2
i1t ::: bi1tbiJt
: : ::: :
biJtbi0t biJtbi1t ::: b
2
iJt
377777775
and, considering that xijt are exogenous and thus E [xijtvit] = 0, we can simplify the
last term in (C.18) as,
E [b
0
itvit] = (   1) cov (ln yit 1; ln it 1)p (C.19)
where p  (1;0)0 and 0 is 1 J zero vector.
Substituting (C.19) into (C.18), we obtain:
be = e+ (Ei E [b0itbit]) 1 p(   1)2 (C.20)
since, from Appendix B, cov (ln yit 1; ln it 1) = 2.
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D. Countries,variables and data source
List of Countries: Countries samples included in this study (arranged according
to the panel ID numbers) are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep., Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States.
Raw Data: Original variables extracted from the WDI database (World Bank,
2012) for 1970 to 2010 include GDP (constant 2000 US$), Ratio of Investment to
GDP, Gross national expenditure (constant 2000 US$), Exports of goods and ser-
vices (constant 2000 US$), Imports of goods and services (constant 2000 US$), total
population.
Manipulation and estimation: First the log of GDPwas taken and Christiano-
Fitzgerald lter of GDP (cfzz) was computed using the time series (panel) routine in
STATA. Panel was constructed with time series of above 18 countries. Then, Eviews
routines for panel OLS and GMM were used for estimation of parameters. Eviews
commands used include GMM(CX=F) CFZ CFZ(-1) @ CFZ(-3) INV_RATIO; CFZ
= C(1) + C(2)*CFZ(-1) + [CX=F]; CFZ = C(1) + C(2)*CFZ(-1); GMM CFZ
CFZ(-1) LNPOP(-1) @ CFZ(-3) INV_RATIO; GMM CFZ C CFZ(-1) LNPOP(-
1) @ CFZ(-3) LNPOP(-3) LIMP. System GMM was run in STATA [xtdpdsys cfz
L(0/2).lgpercapy, lags(1) twostep].
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